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I. INTRODUCTION
The adoption of the new Dissolution of Marriage Act1 is without
doubt the most dramatic change in Florida's family law since it became
a state. This law, which became effective on July 1, 1971, has been labeled
in the press as the "no-fault divorce law." In reality, it is a combination
of "no-fault" and "divorce by consent" concepts. Under the new law, a
marriage will be "dissolved" when the court finds that the marriage is
"irretrievably broken." This phrase may have been borrowed from the
English Divorce Reform Act of 19692 which provides that a divorce may
be granted if it is proven that the marriage "has broken down irretriev-
ably."3 While the English act defines this concept of irretrievable break-
down,4 such a definition is noticeably lacking in the Florida act.
1. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, repealing FLA. STAT. §§ 61.041, 61.042, 61.051, 61.15
(1969), creating FLA. STAT. §§ 61.043, 61.044, 61.052.
2. The Divorce Reform Act 1969.
3. Id. § 1.
4. Id. § 2. Proof of breakdown
(1) The court hearing a petition for divorce shall hold the marriage to have
broken down irretrievably unless the petitioner satisfies the court of one or more
of the following facts, that is to say-
(a) that the respondent has committed adultery and the petitioner finds it
intolerable to live with the respondent;
(b) that the respondent has behaved in such a way that the petitioner cannot
reasonably be expected to live with the respondent;
(c) that the respondent has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of
at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition;
(d) that the parties to the marriage have lived apart for a continuous period
of at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition
and the respondent consents to a decree being granted;(e) that the parties to the marriage have lived apart for a continuous period
of at least five years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition.7.3
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It is also interesting to compare the Florida criterion with that of
the current law of the Soviet Union which provides for the dissolution
of marriage "if it is established by a court of law that the further joint
life of the partners and the preservation of their family have become
impossible." 5 Even more closely related to the Florida approach is the
standard used in California:'
A court may decree a dissolution of the marriage ... on either
of the following grounds, which shall be pleaded generally:
(1) Irreconcilable differences, which have caused the ir-
remediable breakdown of the marriage.
(2) Incurable insanity.
Comparing the Florida and California legislation, it is apparent that
Florida has borrowed heavily from the terminology in the California
statute. Therefore, California decisions under its act should have prece-
dent value in Florida.
In the area of financial responsibility and child custody, the Florida
act attempts to place husbands and wives on a plane of equality because
either spouse may now be required to pay alimony, child support, at-
torney's fees and court costs to the other. In addition, alimony to either
spouse may now be awarded for a limited period designed to allow the
recipient spouse to "rehabilitate" himself or herself, rather than the
former perpetual dole concept. Finally, in determining the custody of
minor children, the courts are now commanded to give equal considera-
tion to both parents rather than the former policy of preferring the
mother simply because she was the mother.
The new act is a combination of the old and the new since it tracks
the existing statutes in some areas and completely supersedes them in
others. As a result of this approach, it is suggested that many of the
dreams of the draftsmen will be unfulfilled because courts will use pre-
act cases to construe the act. In addition, the act does not purport to be
all embracing and much of Florida family law will remain case oriented.
The Dissolution of Marriage Act will be discussed under the ap-
propriate sections of this article. Minor statutory changes made by the
act will be indicated. Those sections of the act which make dramatic
changes in existing law will be quoted verbatim.
II. MARRIAGE AND ANNULMENT
A. Multiple Marriages
One of the strongest presumptions known to Florida law is that
when two women claim to be the widow of a deceased man, the second
5. Basic Principles of Legislation in the U.S.S.R. and Union Republics on Marriage and
the Family, Article 14, Appendix to Stove, The New Fundamental Principles of Soviet
Family Law and Their Social Background, 18 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 392, 415 (1969).
6. Ch. 1608, § 4506, [1969] Cal. Laws Reg. Sess. Section 4507 attempts to define
"irreconcilable differences": "Irreconcilable differences are those grounds which are de-
termined by the court to be substantial reasons for not continuing the marriage and which
make it appear that the marriage should be dissolved."
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marriage is presumed valid, and the burden of rebutting this presumption
rests upon the first wife, even though she must prove a negative. It is
not necessary for the first wife to show the absence of grounds for divorce
in order to overcome the presumption of validity of the second marriage.
However, the presence of grounds for divorce should be given great con-
sideration in weighing the evidence used to overcome the presumption.
As a result, when a ground for divorce did exist between the first wife
and the husband and the evidence showed that the husband stated he
was not married; that his first wife had been absent from the marital
home for more than ten years and had never communicated with him;
that he was a seaman employed in states other than Florida and that
the first wife failed to introduce certificates from the departments of
vital statistics of these foreign states showing that no divorce had been
entered, this evidence would be sufficient to justify the trial court in
holding that the presumption of the validity of the second marriage had
not been rebutted.7
B. Common Law Marriages
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has held that when
a couple divorce and continue to live together agreeing that the divorce
means nothing to them this does not indicate the formation of a common
law marriage, but merely constitutes an attempt to disregard the legal
effect of a divorce. Further, if the parties attempt to keep the fact of
their divorce a secret, any cohabitation subsequent to the divorce can not
ripen into a common law marriage without a new agreement to become
husband and wife.'
A typical law school examination question was presented in the case
of Dandy v. DandyY A woman received an interlocutory divorce decree
in California and subsequently married a man in Florida before her
California decree became final. While the woman knew of the inter-
locutory decree, the Florida "husband" did not. Subsequently, the
"husband" learned that at the time of his ceremonial marriage his "wife"
had not received a final divorce from her prior husband. The parties
continued to cohabit after the interlocutory decree became final, and
the "husband" agreed that he would remarry her at a later date. Fortu-
nately, or unfortunately, he never did. The "wife" claimed that a com-
mon law marriage had come into existence. The court held that the origi-
nal "marriage" was void on the grounds that it was bigamous. In addition,
in order to prove a common law marriage, the wife would have to show
that there was a present, as opposed to a future, agreement to be husband
and wife. The "wife" was able to demonstrate only that her "husband"
had promised to marry her in the future; she, therefore, was unable to
prove a common law marriage.
7. In re Estate of Yohn, 238 So.2d 290 (Fla. 1970).
8. Williams v. Dade County, 237 So.2d 776 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
9. 234 So.2d 728 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
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In order to establish a common law marriage it is insufficient to prove
merely that the parties lived together and represented to their landlord
and to members of their respective families that they were married; it
is also necessary to prove that there was a written or oral agreement be-
tween the parties to be husband and wife.'
III. DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE
A. The Dissolution of Marriage Act
In conformity with prior law governing divorces, proceedings for
the dissolution of marriage under the new Dissolution of Marriage Act
are in Chancery." The person filing the petition for dissolution must have
resided for six months in Florida before filing of the petition. 2 The
dissolution of marriage is to be a vinculo and not from bed and board.'"
Proceedings for dissolution may be brought against persons residing out
of the state, 4 and no final judgment of dissolution of marriage may be
entered until at least twenty days have elapsed from the date of the filing of
the original petition except upon a showing that injustice Would result
from this delay."
Since the new act operates on the "no-fault" concept, Florida Statutes
sections 61.041 (grounds for divorce), and 61.042 (incurable insanity
as ground for divorce) have been repealed.'6 In addition, sections 61.051
(which illegitimacized children born of a bigamous marriage) and 61.15
(which provided for attorney's fees for wives in enforcing alimony and
support awards) have also been repealed.'7
A "proceeding" for dissolution of marriage or a proceeding for sup-
port of the wife and children in the event of the husband's failure to
support must be commenced by the filing in the circuit court of a petition
entitled "In re the marriage of -, husband, and -, wife." A copy of
this petition is then served upon the other party in the same manner as
other civil process.
The defenses of condonation, collusion, recrimination and laches are
similarly abolished as defenses to "divorce and legal separation."'" This
is a beautiful work of drafting-defenses to "divorce" are abolished,
and then the same act abolishes "divorce." This is a kind of legal double
negative.
Under the act "[n]o judgment of dissolution of marriage shall be
10. In re Estate of Yohn, 229 So.2d 612 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
11. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, § 2, amending FLA. STAT. § 61.011 (1969).
12. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, § 3, amending FLA. STAT. § 61.021 (1969).
13. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, § 4, amending FLA. STAT. § 61.031 (1969).
14. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, § 8, amending FLA. STAT. § 61.061 (1969).
15. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, § 20, amending FLA. STAT. § 61.19 (1969).
16. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, § 22.
17. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, § 22.
18. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, § 6, adding FLA. STAT. § 61.044.
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granted unless one of the following acts appears, which shall be pleaded
generally: "
(a) The marriage is irretrievably broken:
(b) Mental incompetence of one of the parties, provided,
however, that no dissolution shall be allowed unless the party
alleged to be incompetent shall have been adjudged incompetent
according to the provisions of section 394.22, Florida Statutes,
for a preceding period of at least three (3) years. Notice of the
proceeding for dissolution shall be served upon one (1) of the
nearest blood relatives or guardian of such incompetent person,
and such relative or guardian shall be entitled to appear and to
be heard upon the issues. If the incompetent party has a general
guardian or a guardian of his person other than the party bring-
ing the proceeding, the petition and summons shall be served
upon the incompetent party and such guardian, and the guardian
shall defend and protect the interests of the incompetent party.
If the incompetent party has no general guardian or guardian
of his person, the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to de-
fend and protect the interests of the incompetent party; pro-
vided, however, in all dissolution of marriages granted on the
basis of incompetency the court may require the petitioner to
pay alimony pursuant to the provisions of section 61.08, Florida
Statutes.
At the hearing for dissolution of marriage, the evidence need not be
corroborated except to establish the fact of required residence. If the
ground for dissolution is that the marriage is "irretrievably broken," the
court shall dispose of the petition as follows :20
(a) If there are no minor children of the marriage and if
the respondent does not, by answer to the petition for dissolution
deny that the marriage is irretrievably broken, the court shall
enter a judgment of dissolution of the marriage if the court finds
that the marriage is irretrievably broken.
(b) Where there are minor children of the marriage or
where the respondent denies by answer to the petition for dis-
solution that the marriage is irretrievably broken, the court may:
1. Order either or both parties to consult with a marriage
counselor, a psychologist or psychiatrist, a minister, priest, or
rabbi, or any other person deemed qualified by the court and
acceptable to the party or parties ordered to seek consultation; or
2. Continue the proceedings for a reasonable length of
time not to exceed three (3) months, to enable the parties them-
selves to effect a reconciliation; or
3. Take such other action as may be in the best interest of
the parties and the minor children of the marriage.
If, at any time, the court finds that the marriage is irretriev-
19. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, § 7, adding FLA. STAT. § 61.052.
20. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, § 7, adding FLA. STAT. §§ 61.052(2)-(4).
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ably broken, the court shall enter a judgment of dissolution of
the marriage. If the court finds that the marriage is not irretriev-
ably broken, it shall deny the petition for dissolution of mar
riage.
(3) During any period of continuance the court may make
appropriate orders, for the support and alimony of the parties,
the custody, support, maintenance and education of the minor
children of the marriage, attorney's fees, and for the preserva-
tion of the property of the parties.
(4) A judgment of dissolution of marriage shall result in
each spouse having the status of being single and unmarried. No
judgment of dissolution of marriage renders the children of
such marriage illegitimate.
It is submitted that the above quoted portion of the new act is an in-
credibly sloppy sample of legislative drafting and would appear to fall
within the "void for vagueness" test. For example:
1. What does "irretrievably broken" mean? It is a cardinal rule in bill
drafting that new terms should be defined in the same act that intro-
duces them.
2. How long must the parties consult with a marriage counselor, priest,
minister, rabbi, etc.? What is the trial court judge to do in this regard?
If the judge is "in favor of dissolution," a half-hour conference may
be enough. However, if the judge is opposed to the dissolution con-
cept, he may order months of consultation.
3. What is a "marriage counselor?" In Florida, any quack or confidence
man may call himself (or herself) a marriage counselor.
4. A judge opposing dissolution may continue the proceedings for a pe-
riod of up to three months. His colleague down the hall, however, may
find instantly that the marriage is "irretrievably broken" and dissolve
it.
It would appear that under subsection (a) of the above, the law is
coming very close to "consent divorce." For example, it would seem that
in the event of a childless marriage and the failure of the respondent to
deny, either in his answer or in the event of a default, that the marriage
is irretrievably broken, it would appear that the trial court is almost
bound to grant a judgment of dissolution upon the simple statement of
the petitioner that "I cannot stand to live with the respondent." The peti-
tioner's "I cannot stand" testimony need not be corroborated, and the
trial court judge would seem to have little, if any, discretion but to grant
the dissolution. Even if an answer is filed and the defendant denies that
the marriage is irretrievably broken, how can the defendant contest the
allegation?
B. Jurisdiction
A sheriff's return of personal service of process is presumed to be
correct, but this presumption is rebuttable. Therefore, if a former wife
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testifies that she had never lived with her sister upon whom service had
been made but had lived with her mother at an address different from
the one mentioned in the summons and that she was unaware of the
divorce proceedings until years after the divorce decree was entered, she
has rebutted the presumption of correctness of the sheriff's return. Thus,
she may attack the final decree upon the grounds that the court never
had jurisdiction over her even though her attack is made after the death
of her former husband.21
Sections 49.011, 49.021 and 49.041 of the Florida Statutes (1969)
require constructive service of process only at the defendant's last known
residence. As a result, a wife may sign a memorandum with her husband
that she may find the husband's address at any time from the named
attorney of her husband and then ignore this memorandum and send the
notice to appear to her husband's last known residence and secure a di-
vorce from him without his knowledge and it will be error for the trial
court to set aside the divorce on the ground that it was obtained by
fraud.2 The author has no quarrel with the abstract proposition that
the words "residence" and "address" are not synonymous, but the ap-
plication of the proposition to these facts seems to be a little strained.
C. Grounds and Defenses
Inasmuch as the Dissolution of Marriage Act has repealed the
defense of condonation to divorce,23 a discussion of cases dealing with
adultery and its condonation might appear to be irrelevant. However,
under the new Act the trial court judge in awarding alimony may con-
sider the adultery of a spouse and the circumstances thereof in deter-
mining whether alimony should be awarded. 24 Likewise, in determining
a proper award of alimony he may also consider "any factor necessary
to do equity and justice between the parties. 25 Under the latter provi-
sion, it would appear that the conduct, whether adultery, cruelty, deser-
tion, etc., of a spouse may have a bearing in determining the amount of
any alimony award. Upon this basis, it is submitted that some of the pre-
act cases will have continued relevancy, if only in regard to financial
considerations.
The Florida Supreme Court has re-affirmed 21 the rule laid down in
Stockham v. Stockham27 that a plaintiff in a divorce action should not be
permitted to prosecute the action further if he refuses to answer questions
dealing with his alleged adultery upon the basis of the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. The court disapproved of the third
21. Black v. Black, 227 So.2d 53 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
22. Roxby v. Roxby, 235 So.2d 58 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
23. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, § 6, adding FLA. STAT. § 61.044.
24. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, § 10, amending FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1969).
25. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, § 10.
26. Minor v. Minor, 240 So.2d 301 (Fla. 1970), aff'g Minor v. Minor, 232 So.2d 746
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1970). Followed in Simonet v. Simonet, 241 So.2d 720 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
27. 168 So.2d 320 (Fla. 1964).
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district's contrary opinion in Simkins v. Simkins.28 In a case decided
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Stockham, the District Court
of Appeal, Fourth District, held that when a plaintiff-husband refuses
to testify upon a deposition as to his alleged adultery on the basis of his
privilege against self-incrimination, the trial court could strike his com-
plaint but could not commit the husband to jail upon the grounds of
contempt because of his refusal.29
It is reversible error for the trial court judge to refuse to compel
an adult son of the spouses to testify concerning his father's association
with another woman. The fact that the son will be placed in an awkward
position and that the actions of the wife's attorney may be in poor taste
is not sufficient reason for the trial court judge's refusal to compel the
son to testify.80
The defense of condonation of adultery received a rather narrow de-
lineation in Chandler v. Chandler.8 1 The wife admitted to her husband
that she had committed adultery with a man, but she gave a fictitious
name to her paramour. The parties continued to quarrel about her con-
duct but they resumed marital relations. Apparently the wife then ad-
mitted that she had adulterous relations with two additional men and the
parties separated. The husband sued for divorce and the wife asserted
condonation as a defense. The court held that full knowledge of adultery
is an essential element of condonation, and the husband's resumption of
cohabitation with her would not be a condonation of the first adultery
because of the fictitious name given by the wife. Further, he did not
condone the adultery with the other two men because he did not have
knowledge of their existence. The court also noted that the continued
bickering on the part of the husband concerning the wife's adulterous
activities indicated an absence of forgiveness. Finally, the court held
that, in order for the resumption of marital relations to be considered
as a condonation of adultery without proof of actual forgiveness, the
husband must not only have knowledge of the adulterous acts but must
have sufficient evidence to prove that adultery was committed. Since the
husband did not know the names of the paramours he would not have
sufficient proof of adultery. It would appear that if an adulterous wife
is candid about her sexual activities, a resumption of marital relations
will constitute condonation, but if she is less than candid it will not. It
is questionable whether there should be a distinction between acts of
adultery based upon the identity of the male.
D. Invalidity
A classical law school examination factual pattern was presented
in Dixson v. Dennard.82 A man asked a woman to marry him, but she
28. 219 So.2d 724 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
29. Cotton v. Cotton, 239 So.2d 865 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964).
30. Spencer v. Spencer, 242 So.2d 786 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
31. 230 So.2d 723 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
32. 243 So.2d 472 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
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informed him that she already had a husband. The man then persuaded
the woman to divorce her husband and marry him. The man furnished
funds for the divorce and secured the services of a lawyer for his future
wife. The divorce was obtained, the new marriage was entered into and
a son was born of this union. Upon the death of this man, his minor grand-
children (the result of a previous marriage) brought suit to invalidate
the second marriage of their grandfather upon the ground that the con-
structive service of process which was used in the divorce suit of their
alleged "step-grandmother" against her former husband was improper.
Therefore, the grandchildren contended, she was still married to another
at the time of her marriage to their grandfather. A decree of invalidity
would, of course, have resulted in the bastardization of the minor child
born of the union of the grandfather with the new wife. The court held
that the grandfather would have been estopped to attack the validity of
his marriage on these grounds because he engineered the allegedly in-
valid divorce resulting in a change of position by his new wife, the birth
of a son and the enjoyment of the marriage by the grandfather. Since
the minor grandchildren were claiming as heirs of the grandfather, they
were also subject to the same estoppel defense.
E. Procedure
A wife has the right to discharge her counsel at any time, with or
without cause, and to retain new counsel to represent her as plaintiff in
a divorce action. Therefore, it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court
judge to refuse to grant a continuance upon a motion of newly retained
counsel in the absence of a showing that the wife was trying to frustrate
the orderly conclusion of the case by her actions.33
In an unusual application of the attorney-client privilege, the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that in a divorce action
it is improper to allow a psychiatrist to testify over the objections of the
client as to the mental condition of a patient, when his testimony was
based upon two tape-recorded telephone conversations between the client
and her attorney which were furnished to the psychiatrist by the attorney
without his client's consent.34
Rule 1.540(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes
a trial court judge to grant relief from final judgments, orders, and de-
crees when there has been some "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or ex-
cusable neglect." In light of this rule, the District Court of Appeal,
First District, has held that a trial court judge may vacate a final judg-
ment and then redate it so that an appeal could be taken when the earlier
divorce judgment had been entered without the knowledge of the hus-
band. It should be noted that the husband's motion to vacate was filed
after the thirty day appeal period had expired, and that if the trial court
33. Tsavaris v. Tsavaris, 244 So.2d 450 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
34. Schetter v. Schetter, 239 So.2d 51 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
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had not redated the judgment, he would not have had an opportunity to
appeal. 85
In another case, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, held
that when a defendant-husband's cause of action against his father-in-law
is totally unrelated to a divorce action brought by the wife against the
husband, it is error for the trial court to permit the impleading of the
father-in-law under rule 1.180 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. 8
It would not be an abuse of discretion for the trial court to grant
a continuance to the husband upon the condition that the husband would
agree to stay further proceedings in a foreign action that he had brought
against the wife, and to deny the continuance when the husband refused
to agree to the imposed condition.
A final written decree of divorce, in regard to the winning party
and the disposition of property, must conform to the judge's orally pro-
nounced "decree" at the close of the final hearing. If the decree fails to
conform, the case should be remanded for the entry of a decree which
does conform.8
IV. ALIMONY
A. Alimony Pendente Lite
Section 61.071 of the Florida Statutes (1969) was slightly amended
by the new Dissolution of Marriage Act:8"
61.071 Alimony pendente lite.-In every proceeding for
dissolution of the marriage, a party may claim alimony and suit
money in the petition or by motion, and if the petition is well
founded, the court shall allow a reasonable sum therefor. If a
party in any proceeding for dissolution of marriage claims ali-
mony or suit money in his answer or by motion, and the answer
or motion is well founded, the court shall allow a reasonable
sum therefor.
In Florida temporary alimony is not awarded as a matter of right.
Rather, it may be granted only upon a "well founded" complaint. It
is error, therefore, for the court to award temporary alimony if the order
is silent as to the complaint being well founded and the trial court judge
has refused to consider the wife's alleged adultery prior to the making
of the award.4 0
In a rather ambiguous opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida has
apparently held that a Florida court may not award temporary alimony
to a plaintiff-wife when the husband asserts the defense that he has se-
35. Woldarsky v. Woldarsky, 243 So.2d 629 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
36. Dick v. Dick, 238 So.2d 469 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
37. Huxford v. Huxford, 231 So.2d 868 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
38. Westberry v. Westberry, 226 So.2d 405 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
39. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, § 9, amending FLA. STAT. § 61.071 (1969).
40. Gilbert v. Gilbert, 241 So.2d 713 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1970).
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cured a divorce in a foreign state and the Florida court has not deter-
mined whether the foreign divorce decree is valid.41 The author is forced
to agree with dissenting Justice Ervin that, inasmuch as the wife
asked for alimony, the trial court had the power to award it even if the
foreign decree were valid under the divisible divorce theory articulated
in Pawley v. Pawley.4"
A wife's affidavit, when considered with the pleadings in a divorce
case, may establish a prima facie right to be heard for the award of tem-
porary alimony and attorney's fees even though she is absent from the
state at the time of the hearing. It is, therefore, reversible error for the
court to summarily deny the motion for the award.4" Likewise, it is re-
versible error for a trial court judge to entirely set aside a judgment
providing for alimony and child support payments pending further testi-
mony in the case without awarding alimony and child support pendente
lite when the evidence shows the husband has continued to receive a
salary.44 It would also appear to be reversible error for the trial court,
upon an application for temporary alimony and attorney's fees, to order
that the wife should be denied final alimony, court costs and attorney's
fees.45 Lastly, unless supersedeas of an alimony judgment is effectuated,
the trial court may enforce the payment of alimony pending the appeal
by the use of the contempt process.46
B. Permanent Alimony
Section 61.08 of the Florida Statutes (1969) was completely changed
by the Dissolution of Marriage Act. The new section provides that:
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court
may grant alimony to either party, which alimony may be reha-
bilitative or permanent in nature. In any award of alimony the
court may order periodic payments or payments in lump sum or
both. The court may consider the adultery of a spouse and the
circumstances thereof in determining whether alimony shall be
awarded to such spouse and the amount of alimony, if any, to be
awarded to such spouse.
(2) In determining a proper award of alimony, the court
may consider any factor necessary to do equity and justice be-
tween the parties.17
The above language evidently leaves the question of alimony solely
within the discretion of the individual trial court judge. Hopefully, the
courts will utilize the concept that alimony should terminate after the
41. Newton v. Newton, 245 So.2d 45 (Fla. 1971).
42. 46 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1950).
43. Valentine v. Valentine, 244 So.2d 503 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
44. Edwards v. Edwards, 243 So.2d 12 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
45. Jordan v. Jordan, 243 So.2d 607 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
46. Helin v. Helin, 235 So.2d 533 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
47. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, § 10, amending FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1969).
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rehabilitation of the other spouse, whether by improved health, educa-
tion, training, etc. It is doubtful that many courts will award alimony
to husbands except in the most extreme cases dealing with sick or dis-
abled men.
It is reversible error when the final decree of divorce fails to make
any mention of alimony and any finding of the equities between the
parties.48 However, when a trial court fails to reserve jurisdiction to
award alimony in the future upon a change in circumstances, the ap-
pellate court may amend the divorce judgment to provide for the reser-
vation of jurisdiction; it need not remand the case to the trial court to
enter an amended judgment.49
It has been held that a trial court may not increase the amount of
alimony or child support payments when the parties have stipulated as
to these amounts during the progress of the action and the stipulation
is not the result of fraud, deceit, coercion, trickery or overreaching.5 °
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that former section 61.08
of the Florida Statutes which forbade the granting of alimony to an
adulterous wife was not a denial of equal protection or of due process
and was, therefore, constitutional under the Federal and state constitu-
tions."'
It would appear that trial court judges should give consideration
to the income tax consequences involved in allocating alimony and child
support awards. For example, the District Court of Appeal, Third Dis-
trict, has held that it is error to award $400 per month for child support
for a two-year-old child and $100 per month alimony to the wife in the
absence of any evidence justifying this allocation. The court remanded
the case to the trial court for reconsideration including the tax conse-
quences to the parties if the alimony award were increased and the child
support amounts were decreased.52
An award of alimony must be based upon a showing of the wife's
needs and the husband's ability to pay. Therefore, if the wife merely
demonstrates her needs, without evidencing the husband's financial abil-
ity to pay, the trial court may properly deny her alimony. The trial court
should, however, retain jurisdiction over the case in order to modify the
judgment upon a subsequent showing that the husband's financial ability
has improved.5"
C. Lump Sum Alimony
It is reversible error to award lump sum alimony to a relatively
wealthy wife on the ground that she suffered financial losses occasioned
48. Reed v. Reed, 226 So.2d 114 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
49. Reed v. Reed, 244 So.2d 449 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
50. Costa v. Costa, 245 So.2d 123 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
51. Pacheco v. Pacheco, 246 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1971).
52. Drucker v. Drucker, 239 So.2d 117 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
53. Carmody v. Carmody, 230 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
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by the conduct of her husband, a man of meager means. 54 In McGarry v.
McGarry,51 a case decided under pre-Dissolution Act principles, it was
held that a trial court judge may award lump sum alimony payable in
installments. However, he may not award "pure" alimony and provide
that it shall be terminated at a fixed time in the future. The trial court
judge should reserve jurisdiction to extend the period for payment if the
circumstances should later justify it. Although it is not entirely certain,
it would appear that the new Dissolution of Marriage Act, providing for
the awarding of alimony to rehabilitate a spouse, may reverse the holding
of this case.56
It is not erroneous for a trial court to award lump sum alimony
when the wife has prayed for it, the husband has raised no objection and
the wife, on appeal, alleges that it is an abuse of discretion. However,
a judgment of this nature should provide that the trial court retains ju-
risdiction to modify the award by providing for periodic alimony if it
should become necessary in the future . 7 On the other hand, it is error
to award alimony in a lump sum to the wife when the evidence discloses
that the husband is unable to make one lump sum payment or even begin
to pay the lump sum award in weekly payments until seven months after
the date of the judgment.58
The fact that a court retains jurisdiction over the entire divorce case
does not give it the power to award permanent or lump sum alimony after
the entry of the divorce judgment.59
A judge may award the husband's undivided one-half interest in home-
stead property to the wife as lump sum alimony; however, the final judg-
ment should reserve jurisdiction over the case to award alimony to the
wife if there should be a change of circumstances.60
D. Enforcement of the Award
Section 61.11 of the Florida Statutes (1969) was amended by the
Dissolution of Marriage Act to provide that when either party receives
alimony, he or she is free from the control of the other in the manner
of spending the money. In addition, a writ of ne exeat or the injunctive
process may be used against the party paying the alimony, whether it
be the husband or the wife.6
Section 88.291 of the Florida Statutes (1969), commonly referred
to as the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law, provides
that any proceedings under the law shall not confer jurisdiction over the
parties in any other proceedings. As a result, when a wife brings an ac-
54. Black v. Black, 247 So.2d 775 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
55. 247 So.2d 13 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
56. See Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, § 10, amending FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1969).
57. Arthur v. Arthur, 243 So.2d 8 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
58. Chester v. Chester, 241 So.2d 190 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
59. Comcowich v. Comcowich, 237 So.2d 66 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
60. Barfield v. Barfield, 226 So.2d 132 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
61. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, § 13, amending FLA. STAT. § 61.11 (1969).
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tion in Florida to enforce the payment of arrearages due under a support
order of New Jersey, it is reversible error for the trial court to enter a
counterclaim for divorce filed by the husband. 2
The case of Bendl v. Bend 63 presents an intertwining of the lam
governing homesteads, estates by the entirety and claims for accrued ali.
mony. Charles and his first wife owned property as an estate by the en-
tirety. They were divorced (becoming tenants in common) and Charles
married a second wife who lived with him on the property. In 1963 the
first wife secured a judgment against Charles for accrued alimony but
the recorded judgment was never satisfied. Subsequently, pursuant to the
1968 Florida Constitution, Charles and his second wife executed a deed
conveying Charles' one-half of the property to themselves as an estate by
the entirety. Later, Charles died and the first wife sought to enforce the
judgment against the second wife's one-half interest and to partition the
property between the two women. The court held that the property did
not pass to the second wife as homestead property. Rather, it vested by
operation of law in the surviving spouse. Between the divorce from the
first wife and the marriage of the second, Charles occupied the property
as a homestead and the judgment could not constitute a lien against the
property while it had this status. The court held that, due to the particular
facts in the case, the homestead status was lost at the time of Charles'
death. Therefore, the entire estate of Charles vested in the second wife
and would not be subject to the lien of the judgment. Hence, partition
would be justified with each wife receiving one-half of the real estate.
The sentencing of a husband to jail for contempt for his failure to
pay an award of alimony and attorney's fees does not constitute an un-
constitutional imprisonment for debt. It is not the failure to pay the award
but the disobedience of the court's command which furnishes grounds for
the imprisonment."
The District Court of Appeal, First District, has held that when the
wife has a civil cause of action for non-support she should not utilize
the process of criminal prosecution in lieu of the civil, and a judgment
of acquittal should be entered upon the defendant's motion in the criminal
trial court. 5 It is submitted that the court has butchered the law by its
poor analysis of the problem; what the wife "should" do has no bearing
on what the law "is."
E. Modification of Alimony and Support
Section 61.14 of the Florida Statutes (1969) was amended by the
Dissolution of Marriage Act to be consistent with the concept that either
party may be ordered to pay alimony."6 A new subsection, (4), was
added:
62. Simpson v. Simpson, 247 So.2d 792 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
63. 246 So.2d 574 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
64. DeFrances v. Knowles, 244 So.2d 168 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
65. Russ v. State, 242 So.2d 148 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1970).
66. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, § 16, amending FLA. STAT. § 61.14 (1969).
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(4) If a party applies for a reduction of alimony or child
support and the circumstances justify the reduction, the court
may make the reduction of alimony or child support regardless
of whether or not the party applying for it has fully paid the
accrued obligations to the other party at the time of the applica-
tion or at the time of the order of modification.
The above statutory change has been long overdue. Under the former
rule, a husband who was behind in his payments could not apply for a
modification of future payments unless he either paid the unpaid amounts
or proved that he was unable to do so through no fault of his own. If
unable to prove this latter point, he could be denied any relief.17
It is erroneous for the trial court to order the former husband to pay
increased child support and alimony for a retroactive period which pre-
cedes the date of the filing of the petition for modification.6"
Alimony and child support payments as provided for in a property
settlement agreement may be modified subsequently upon a showing of
a change of conditions.69
A trial court may not modify the court-ordered alimony provisions
in a final divorce decree subsequent to the death of the former wife.70
A court may modify an award of alimony by increasing the amount
for a limited time in order to pay for unanticipated education expenses
even though the wife admits that there has not been a substantial change
in her ordinary expenses aside from the educational ones.7 '
Under former section 61.14 of the Florida Statutes (1969), the ali-
mony provisions of a final divorce decree could be modified in the event
of a subsequent change in the husband's financial ability or in the event
of subsequent changes in the wife's needs. The statute did not require
that there be both a change in the husband's financial ability and the
wife's needs.72 The amended version of section 61.14 provides for modi-
fication in the event that "the circumstances or the financial ability of
either party has changed .... ,,7' As a result, it would appear that the
amended statute is entirely in accord with the prior interpretation of the
statute.
It is within the discretion of a trial court judge to grant a petition for
modification of alimony based upon subsequent unusual medical expenses
which were not contemplated at the time of the final divorce decree.7 4
67. See, e.g., Blanton v. Blanton, 154 Fla. 750, 18 So.2d 902 (1944); Selige v. Selige,
138 Fla. 783, 190 So. 251 (1939); Ohmes v. Ohmes, 200 So.2d 849 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967);
English v. English, 117 So.2d 559 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960).
68. Ramona v. Ramona, 244 So.2d 547 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
69. See, e.g., Ohmes v. Ohmes, 200 So.2d 849 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967); English v. English,
117 So.2d 559 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1960); Blanton v. Blanton, 154 Fla. 750, 18 So.2d 902 (1944);
Selige v. Selige, 138 Fla. 783, 190 So. 251 (1939).
70. Van Boven v. First Nat'l Bank, 240 So.2d 329 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
71. Livenston v. Livenston, 233 So.2d 841 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
72. Rogers v. Rogers, 229 So.2d 618 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969), clarifying Knight v. Knight,
205 So.2d 353 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
73. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, § 16, amending FLA. STAT. § 61.14 (1969).
74. Cuneo v. Cuneo, 229 So.2d 266 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
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V. PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. Jurisdiction
A court does not have power to retain jurisdiction after the finaljudgment in order to subsequently enter a postjudgment order determin-
ing the property rights of the parties. A court may not reserve jurisdic-
tion in its final judgment to settle property rights at some time in the
future.76
B. Dower in Personal Property
During the lifetime of the spouses, a wife's right of dower in real
and personal property of her husband is inchoate, and a husband may
defeat the inchoate dower right in personal property by disposing of the
property during his lifetime by sale or gift. Therefore, there is no basis
in law or equity for an equity court to enjoin a husband from disposing
of his personal property and to award the wife a judgment for the present
value of the inchoate dower upon an annuity basis.76
C. Estates by the Entirety
It is error for the trial court to recognize that the spouses are tenants
by the entirety in certain property and then to fail to adjudicate the
wife's claim to a special equity in this property. 7 It is also reversible
error to award exclusive possession of jointly held real estate to the hus-
band. The parties become tenants in common in accordance with Florida
Statute section 689.15 (1969).78
An interesting facet of the estate in common concept arose in Cog-
gan v. Coggan.79 A husband and wife held title to a professional office
building as an estate by the entirety; upon their divorce they became
tenants in common. The husband, a physician, continued to use the prop-
erty after the divorce as his office and consistently denied any co-tenancy
in the building. The wife brought suit for partition and asked for an
accounting of one-half of the use value of the building from the date of
the divorce. The trial court and the District Court of Appeal, Second
District, held that since the ex-husband from the time of the divorce
denied that the ex-wife had any interest in the property, this was the
equivalent of an ouster of the wife. Therefore, because of the ouster, the
husband was liable for one-half of the rental value of the property. How-
ever, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed the second district's decision
and held that the husband was not liable for one-half of the rental unless
he actually or constructively ousted his former wife or, in some manner,
75. Sistrunk v. Sistrunk, 235 So.2d 53 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). Accord, Penton v. Penton,
246 So.2d 623 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
76. Libberton v. Libberton, 240 So.2d 336 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
77. Henderson v. Henderson, 226 So.2d 699 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
78. Watson v. Watson, 246 So.2d 131 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
79. 230 So.2d 34 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
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impressed upon her the fact that he was claiming exclusive possession
hostile to her. 0
When a divorce judgment has been entered and the appeal period
has expired, the trial court has no jurisdiction to attempt to divest the
wife of her one-half undivided interest as a tenant in common to prop-
erty which was held during the marriage as an estate by the entirety.
Any order of the court permitting the husband to sell the property is
effective solely over the husband's one-half interest, and any purchaser
from the husband succeeds only to this limited interest.8 '
A husband who uses fraud and deceit in the sale of real property
held as an estate by the entirety may subject his wife to liability to the
purchasers on the ground that he acted as her agent in the sale of her
"interest" in the property.
8 2
When a husband creates an estate by the entirety in land with his
wife and the parties are subsequently divorced, they become tenants in
common unless the husband is able to rebut the presumption that he had
made a gift to his wife by clear and convincing evidence. 3 On the other
hand, when it is shown that the wife's separate funds have been used
to purchase property taken in the joint names of the spouses and the
husband has contributed nothing towards the purchase, there is no pre-
sumption of a gift. Rather, the presumption is that the husband holds
as a trustee under a resulting trust with the wife as beneficiary, or that
she has a special equity in the property. However, when the wife fur-
nishes all of the cash towards the purchase price of corporate stock and
the spouses sign a purchase-money promissory note for the balance, the
wife is entitled to sole title to that aliquot portion of the stock purchased
with her separate funds. As to the remaining stock, the parties are tenants
in common,84
It would appear that the trial court may order the division of jointly
held properties in a divorce action when the complaint prays for this re-
lief and the defendant did not object to this procedure during the final
hearing. ,
D. Use of the Marital Home
It is reversible error for the trial court to order the husband to make
the monthly mortgage payments on the family home and also to order
that, in the event of the sale of the home, the monthly mortgage payments
are to be returned to the husband. The effect of such an order would
relieve the husband of half of his obligation to provide a place for his
wife and children to live.86 On the other hand, a trial court may grant
80. Coggan v. Coggan, 239 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1970).
81. Thomas v. Greene, 226 So.2d 143 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1969).
82. DuPuis v. 79th Street Hotel, Inc., 231 So.2d 532 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
83. Home v. Home, 247 So.2d 99 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
84. Hegel v. Hegel, 248 So.2d 212 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
85. See Butcher v. Butcher, 239 So.2d 85$ (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
86. Centrella v. Centrella, 229 So.2d 882 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
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the use of the marital home, formerly held as an estate by the entirety,
to the wife and children without requiring the husband to make the
monthly mortgage payments. If the wife should make the payments, it
would appear that she is entitled to credit for one-half of the total pay-
ments upon a subsequent sale of the property."'
In Mintz v. Ellison,8 a final decree of divorce provided that the
former home of a couple was to be used by the wife and their two minor
children until a certain date and then it was to be sold and the proceeds
divided in a certain manner. Subsequently, the former wife vacated the
premises and brought suit to compel the former husband to pay the
mortgage payments due after she vacated the premises. The trial court
modified the final judgment and granted this relief to the wife. The Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Third District, reversed on the basis that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to modify the final judgment in this manner.
A court may order a husband (during the pendency of a divorce
case) to vacate the marital home if public decency, safety of the parties
or welfare of the children requires this action. However, in the absence
of the foregoing, it is erroneous to order an innocent husband to leave
the marital home on the basis that his wife "harbors deep-seated antago-
nism to the defendant which is intensified by the continued presence of
the defendant in the home.""a
A former husband cannot create an enforceable lien on his undivided
one-half interest in homestead property (which is occupied by his former
wife and the couple's children) by giving his attorney (who was aware
of the status of the property) promissory notes secured by a mortgage.90
E. Estoppel
A classic case of estoppel was illustrated in Edelstein v. Peninsular
Lumber Supply Co."l A husband and wife were involved in divorce pro-
ceedings when a suit for foreclosure of mortgage was brought against
them. Prior to the foreclosure suit, the husband had conveyed his interest
in the property to his wife as part of the divorce settlement. Service of
process in the foreclosure action was made on the husband in his own
behalf and service was made on the wife by leaving a copy of the sum-
mons with the husband. The husband never informed the wife of the
summons (the mortgagee did not know of the husband's failure to inform
his wife of the summons), but she did have knowledge of the foreclosure
proceedings which were continued for two months in order to give her
an opportunity to pay the amount owing. The wife was unable to secure
the needed funds and the property was subsequently foreclosed and
sold to a corporation controlled by the wife's former husband. The
87. Stewart v. Stewart, 231 So.2d 230 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
88. 233 So.2d 156 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
89. Daniel v. Daniel, 236 So.2d 197 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
90. Daniels v. Katz, 237 So.2d 58 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
91. 247 So.2d 721 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
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corporation erected a building on the property, and later defaulted on a
new mortgage given by it to the same mortgagee. The mortgagee brought
foreclosure proceedings against the corporation and the former wife. The
lower court held that the former wife, because of her standing by with
knowledge of the construction of the building for a period of approxi-
mately fifteen months without raising her claim, was estopped from at-
tacking the foreclosure proceedings. It should be noted that the wife was
simultaneously raising the alleged fraud in the court which handled the
original divorce proceedings as well as in the foreclosure proceedings.
F. Legislation
A married woman may now convey her real property, including
dower interests in her husband's property, without the joinder of her
husband. If anything, married women are "more equal" than married
men because, while wives may convey without consent of their husbands,
husbands may not convey without consent of their wivesY2
VI. ATTORNEY'S FEES
A. Dissolution of Marriage Act
Florida Statute section 61.16 (1969) was extensively amended by
the Dissolution of Marriage Act:9"
61.16 Attorney's fees, suit money and costs.-The court
may from time to time, after considering the financial resources
of both parties, order a party to pay a reasonable amount for at-
torney's fees, suit money and the cost to the other party of
maintaining or defending any proceedings under this act, includ-
ing enforcement and modification proceedings. The court may
order that the amount be paid directly to the attorney, who
may enforce the order in his name.
This modestly sized amendment of seventy-six words overrules
countless cases. An attorney may now enforce an attorney's fee award
in his own name, and, hopefully, the courts will hold that he may appeal
an allegedly insufficient award in his own name. Now a wife, or husband,
may ask for an attorney's fee in a modification proceeding. Previously,
fees were awarded only when the wife was enforcing an award or resist-
ing an attempt by the husband to modify it. The most dramatic change,
of course, is the fact that a court may now order the wife to pay her
husband's attorney's fees.
B. Rights to an Award
In a case of apparent first impression, the District Court of Appeal,
First District, held that when a wife is in wilful contempt of court as a
92. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-4, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 694.04, 708.08, 708.09 (1969),
repealing FLA. STAT. §§ 693.01, 693.02, 693.03, 693.04, 693.05, 693.13, 693.14, 708.01, 708.02,
708.03, 708.04, 708.06, 708.07, 62.031 (1969) [Conforming to FLA. CONST. art. X, § 5.].
93. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, § 17, amending FLA. STAT. § 61.16 (1969).
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result of removing herself and her children from the state after the com-
mencement of the suit, it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court judge
to award attorney's fees to her. The court stated:
Though fees which have been allowed for a wife's attorney be-
long to her counsel, the award of the fee is not for the benefit of
her counsel, but is for the equitable objective of putting the wife
on substantially even terms with her husband. 4
It would not appear to be an abuse of discretion for the trial court
to deny an award of attorney's fees and suit money to the wife when
the court finds that she has independent means and that the suit for
divorce was a groundless one. 5
It is a violation of the Code of Ethics for an attorney to testify for
his client when he is also acting as attorney for the client in the trial of
a case. It follows, therefore, that it is an abuse of discretion for the judge
to award legal fees when the attorney also testifies in behalf of his client.96
In Green v. Green,97 the lower court had ordered the husband to
maintain the home for the benefit of his ex-wife and children. Subse-
quently, the ex-wife instituted proceedings requesting the court to fix
responsibility on the ex-husband with reference to the sale of the family
home to satisfy income tax obligations. While the husband was not in
default of the original order, the appellate court upheld the award of at-
torney's fees to the ex-wife on the ground that she was asking the aid of
the court to compel him to comply with the judgment regarding the
property.
C. Corrective Orders
A trial court judge signed a final order dismissing with prejudice the
plaintiff's complaint for divorce and dismissing without prejudice the de-
fendant's counterclaim for separate maintenance. The order inadvertently
omitted a reservation of jurisdiction over the parties and the matter of
attorney's fees and costs for defendant's attorney. However, the judge
was allowed to enter a corrective order under rule 1.540 of the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure. 8
In another case, the trial court awarded attorney's fees to the wife
in accordance with the minimum St. Petersburg Bar Association fee for
an uncontested divorce. The former husband subsequently failed to pay
the "minimum fee." The court, upon motion of the ex-wife and after
hearing arguments of the parties, entered a nunc pro tunc order providing
that the former husband pay $250.00 in attorney's fees to enable the wife
94. Keena v. Keena, 245 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
95. Rine v. Rine, 240 So.2d 655 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
96. Hubbard v. Hubbard, 233 So.2d 150 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
97. 230 So.2d 492 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
98. Fatolitis v. Fatolitis, 247 So.2d 525 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
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to secure a rule to show cause to enforce the award. The trial court's order
was upheld on appeal.99
VII. ANTENUPTIAL AND POST-NUPTIAL PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
A. Antenuptial Agreements
The Supreme Court of Florida reversed the District Court of Ap-
peal, Third District, decision in Posner v. Posner'00 which was criticized
by the author in the preceding survey.' 0 ' The supreme court held that
the alimony provisions of an antenuptial agreement are binding upon
the parties in the event of a subsequent divorce, provided that the hus-
band has made full disclosure of his assets, etc., in accordance with the
rules articulated in the case of Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio. °2 The court
held, in addition, that the amounts of alimony as provided in the ante-
nuptial agreement are subject to subsequent increase or decrease upon a
change of conditions pursuant to former section 61.14 of the Florida
Statutes.
B. Post-Nuptial Agreements
1. ATTACKS ON VALIDITY
Rule 1.540(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure limits certain
attacks on fraudulently obtained decrees to one year after the entering
of the decree. However, it does not preclude a former wife from bringing
an action to set aside a decree which approved a separation agreement
upon the basis that the former husband lied about his assets more than
a year after the decree was entered.'0
It would appear that the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
is of the view that when a wife is represented by an attorney and her
husband is not represented, the husband is not a fiduciary in his nego-
tiations resulting in a property settlement. He is under no duty "on his
own motion, to make any representations to her with respect to his
property."' °
When a husband in a post-nuptial agreement has released his rights
in any potential homestead property which might be owned by his wife,
whereas in an antenuptial agreement he released only his nonexistent
curtesy or intestacy rights in his wife's property, the post-nuptial agree-
99. Peters v. Peters, 243 So.2d 424 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
100. Posner v. Posner, 233 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1970), reversing Posner v. Posner, 206 So.2d
416 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968). For further proceedings, see Posner v. Posner, 237 So.2d 186
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1970); Posner v. Posner, 245 So.2d 139 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
101. Murray, Family Law, 1967-1969 Survey of Florida Law, 24 U. MIuA. L. Rav. 296,
313 (1970).
102. 143 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1962).
103. Scales v. Scales, 237 So.2d 50 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
104. Zakoor v. Zakoor, 240 So.2d 193 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
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ment was supported by consideration.105 This case is an illustration of
the fundamental contract principle that sufficient consideration may con-
sist of a mere pepper-corn.
2. CONSTRUCTION OF AGREEMENTS
In Aetna Life Insurance Company v. White,106 a husband and wife
entered into a property settlement agreement containing a general clause
which stated the "intention of the parties that their relations with respect
to property and financial matters be fixed by this Agreement." Unfortu-
nately for the husband's estate, the life insurance policy was not expressly
referred to in the agreement. In a case of apparent first impression in
Florida, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that the
former wife, named prior to the divorce as the named beneficiary, was
entitled to the proceeds of a life insurance policy on the life of the de-
ceased former husband. In so holding, the court placed great weight upon
the fact that the agreement contained a clause wherein the husband re-
leased the wife from all claims, rights, cause§ of action, etc., which he had
against her. However, the agreement was silent as to whether the wife
similarly waived all of her claims against the husband.
When the terms of a property settlement agreement, which are
made part of a final decree of divorce, provide that the father will be
liable for the support of the children after his death, his estate is not
entitled to a credit or discharge of this obligation by reason of death
benefit payments made to the minor children by the Social Security
Administration. 7
The term "gross income" as used in a property settlement agree-
ment was interpreted by the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District.
The property settlement agreement in question provided that the wife
was to receive one-third of her husband's yearly "gross income" based
upon his gross income of the previous year. At the time of the divorce,
the husband owned a business which he later sold. The court held that
it was the intention of the parties in their use of the term "gross income"
to mean that the wife should receive one-third of the net gain that the
husband received from the sale as well as one-third of social security
payments paid to him. 08
3. MODIFICATION
Although a pure property settlement agreement is not subject to
modification, a separation agreement, providing for a division of the prop-
erty and for the care and support of the children and wife, is subject to
modification insofar as these continuing liabilities are concerned. This
is particularly true when the agreement provides that the court shall
105. First Nat'l Bank v. Morse, 248 So.2d 658 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
106. 242 So.2d 771, 773 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
107. Cohen v. Cohen, 246 So.2d 581 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
108. Johnson v. Johnson, 248 So.2d 195 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
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have continuing jurisdiction over alimony and maintenance for the
wife.109
4. TAXATION
Taxation vis-A-vis alimony was in issue in Barsumian v. Bar-
sumian." A separation agreement between a husband and wife provided
that the husband was obligated to pay the wife $750 per month as "alimony
and support." '' The wife was obligated to pay the federal income tax
on this amount. These payments were to continue "so long as the wife
is living and remains unmarried.""12 The agreement, however, failed to
mention anything about support payments for the parties' minor child.
Payments were made for six years. The husband then brought proceed-
ings to have the court allocate what portion of the $750 was for alimony
and what portion was for child support. The husband's obvious intention
was that the monthly payment would be reduced when the minor child
reached majority. The trial court held that $279 would be considered
in the future as child support, and the former wife appealed. The District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that the former husband was
equitably estopped from asserting that a portion of the payment was for
child support after he had maintained for six years that it was alimony
and after his former wife had paid taxes on this "alimony" during that
period.
The term "net income" as used in a property settlement agreement
has been defined to mean "total gross income less the actual expenses in
earning said income.""' 3 As a practical matter, since there is no fixed
criteria (compare accounting principles with the Internal Revenue Code)
as to the meaning of "actual expenses," what is the value of the court's
definition?
VIII. SEPARATE MAINTENANCE
The Dissolution of Marriage Act has completely revamped section
61.09 of the Florida Statutes (1969) and'has amended section 61.10:" *
61.09 Nonsupport.-If a person having the ability to con-
tribute to the maintenance of his or her spouse and support of
his or her minor children fails to do so, the spouse who is not
receiving support or who has custody of the children may peti-
tion the court for alimony and for support for minor children
without petitioning for dissolution of marriage and the court
shall enter such order as it deems just and proper.
61.10 Rights of parties unconnected with dissolution.-
109. Putnam v. Putnam, 226 So.2d 30 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
110. 235 So.2d 515 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
111. Id. at 516.
112. Id.
113. Stayman v. Stayman, 232 So.2d 402, 403 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
114. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, §§ 11-12.
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Except when relief is afforded by some other pending civil
action or proceeding a spouse residing in this state apart from
his spouse and minor children, whether or not such separation
is through his fault, may obtain an adjudication of his obligation
to maintain his spouse and minor children, if any. The court
shall adjudicate his financial obligations to such spouse or
children, or both and fix the custody and visitation rights of the
parties and enforce them. Such an action does not preclude either
party from maintaining any other proceeding under this chapter
for other or additional relief at any time.
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held that when a
husband brings a suit under section 61.10 of the Florida Statutes (1969)
for an adjudication of his financial obligations to his wife and family afid
to fix custody and visitation rights of the parties, the wife may counter-
claim under section 61.09 of the Florida Statutes (1969) for separate
maintenance with grounds for divorce. It is reversible error for the trial
court to strike the counterclaim upon the grounds of redundancy because
the elements of proof necessary to establish a claim under section 61.09
(1969) are distinct from the elements necessary under section 61.10
(1969). In addition, if the counterclaim were stricken, not only would
the wife be collaterally estopped from bringing a subsequent action under
section 61.09, but it would also leave her no way, other than a divorce ac-
tion, to be released from the control of her husband. Lastly, section 61.10
does not provide for court costs and attorney's fees for the wife as does
section 61.09.115
It should be noted that newly adopted section 61.16116 provides for
attorney's fees in actions under amended section 61.10 as well as under
section 61.09. Furthermore the "grounds for divorce" concept in former
section 61.09 has been eliminated in the new version." 7
A trial court is justified in refusing to award separate maintenance
without divorce (provided for by former section 61.09) to a wife when
the evidence shows that the husband has been voluntarily making ade-
quate support payments to her.'18 The result should be the same under
the amended version of section 61.09.11
IX, CUSTODY AND SUPPORT OF CHILDREN
A. Custody
1. DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE ACT
The Dissolution of Marriage Act extensively amended section 61.13
of the Florida Statutes (1969) with respect to the question of custody: 20
115. Dover v. Dover, 241 So.2d 740 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
116. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, § 17, amending FLA. STAT. § 61.16 (1969).
117. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, § 11, amending FLA. STAT. § 61.09 (1969).
118. King v. King, 240 So.2d 326 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
119. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, § 11, amending FLA. STAT. § 61.09 (1969).
120. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, § 15, amending FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (1969).
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(2) The court shall award custody and visitation rights of minor
children of the parties as a part of proceeding for dissolu-
tion of marriage in accordance with the best interests of
the child. Upon considering all relevant factors, the father of
the child shall be given the same consideration as the mother
in determining custody.
The placing of men on a parity with women in custody matters is a
long overdue change which, in many cases, should result in a more ra-
tional selection process. However, as was stated in a recent case:. 2 '
In custody cases it is often impossible to do the right thing
because there is no right thing. Here is a case in which both
mother and father are less than ideal parents, . . .
We cannot say that the judgment entered was the right one.
There is no right one where neither parent is adequate to the
challenge of parenthood. But it was agreed to in open court and
is not legally erroneous.
Affirmed.
Under the former law, the mother was normally preferred as custodian of
young children. However, she was not awarded custody in every case and
a temporary custody award to the father would be upheld in appropriate
circumstances .122
2. JURISDICTION
Once a trial court acquires jurisdiction over minors within the state
as an ancillary phase of a divorce proceeding, jurisdiction cannot be
defeated by the mother unlawfully removing herself and her children
from the state.1
23
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that a Florida
court had no jurisdiction to award custody of a child who was not
physically present in Florida, even though both parents were before the
court and both were domiciled in Florida. In a very strong dissent, Judge
Walden argued that the Florida courts have jurisdiction to award custody
when the child is domiciled in Florida, even though the child might be
physically living in a foreign state. It is submitted that the dissenting
opinion is the correct one; the majority overlooked the distinction between
physical presence and domicile. 24
The Florida court first entering a custody award has continuing juris-
diction over the custody facet and this continuing jurisdiction is exclusive
of any other Florida court which subsequently attempts to modify the
custody award. 125 In a similar vein, a Florida court which makes a cus-
121. Duffy v. Duffy, 247 So.2d 493 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
122. Curtis v. Curtis, 248 So.2d 204 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
123. Keena v. Keena, 245 So.2d 665 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
124. Castle v. Castle, 247 So.2d 455 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
125. Haley v. Edwards, 233 So.2d 647 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
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todial determination retains jurisdiction to modify its custody order. This
jurisdiction is exclusive so that a court in another Florida county does not
have jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings to modify the determina-
tion. 126
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held that the
circuit court, in a habeas corpus proceeding involving child custody,
retains continuing jurisdiction in the proceeding to enforce and/or modify
its final judgment at a subsequent date. On a petition for rehearing, the
court certified the question to the Supreme Court of Florida.'
When the maternal grandfather seeks a writ of habeas corpus in the
circuit court regarding the custody of his grandchildren who are in the
hands of their paternal grandfather, the circuit court may appoint the pa-
ternal grandfather as the guardian of the children. Although guardian-
ship matters normally are conducted in the county judge's court, the
circuit court has concurrent jurisdiction under the Florida Statutes.128
3. DUE PROCESS
In a child custody case, the trial court judge requested investigations
regarding custody to be made by the Florida and Pennsylvania welfare
departments. The judge also announced that further testimony would be
taken after these reports were obtained. When the judge entered a final
order without giving the parties the opportunity to present further testi-
mony, it constituted a deprivation of due process. 29
It is a denial of due process for a trial court judge to enter a final
decree of divorce awarding custody of a minor child to a father when the
father never prayed for custody. The record showed that the father and
mother stipulated that the wife would have custody and a default was
entered against the wife who did not appear at the hearing1 °
It is also reversible error for a trial court judge, in deciding a child
custody question, to consider a report from a social worker who inter-
viewed both parents and a report from probation officers when these
reports have not been introduced into evidence and are not available to
the parties. 8'
4. DIVIDED CUSTODY
"Split custody can be condoned if there are special circumstances or
legally unequal facts present to support such an arrangement.' 8 2 However,
126. Jones v. State ex rel. Greathouse, 241 So.2d 432 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
127. Crane v. Hayes, 244 So.2d 544 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
128. Brooks v. McCutcheon, 244 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), citing FLA. STAT.
§ 744.06(3) (1969).
129. Burton v. Walker, 231 So.2d 20 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
130. Williams v. Williams, 227 So.2d 746 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
131. In re Brown, 246 So.2d 166 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
132. Wonsetler v. Wonsetler, 240 So.2d 870, 871 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970). Hare v. Potter, 233
So.2d 653 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970) has apparently countenanced a divided custody award in
modification proceedings.
FAMILY LAW
when both parents are fit to have custody, it is error to order a split custody
arrangement.
5. MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY AWARDS
It would appear to be erroneous for a trial court to modify a child
custody award by providing that the father might permanently remove
the children to Michigan when this would have the practical effect of pre-
venting the divorced mother from visiting the children which she had been
doing on an almost daily basis.'
When a wife petitions for a modification of a child support award
order based upon a change of circumstances since the last modification,
it is incorrect for the trial judge to dismiss her petition upon the grounds of
res judicata or collateral estoppel unless he grants a full evidentiary hear-
ing on her petition. 84
Although the record may reveal that a wife has indulged in conduct
contrary to the basic moral standards of any community, the appellate
court may refuse to upset an award of child custody to the wife when the
custody order recites that the trial court judge reserves jurisdiction for a
period of six months in order to review the living conditions of the chil-
dren at that time.8 5
6. VISITATION RIGHTS
A trial court judge may sua sponte temporarily terminate a step-
father's right of visitation of his stepdaughters when the trial court judge
believes that the stepfather is preoccupied with sex, even though the
former wife has not sought termination of visitation rights. It is reversible
error, however, for the trial court judge to permanently deprive the step-
father of his visitation rights without affording him a full hearing on this
issue. 186
7. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
If minor children are within the state of Florida, the Florida courts
need not honor a custody decree of a foreign court and should not defer
to what a foreign court may do regarding the custody in a pending action.
The Florida courts have a duty to decide the custody question on the
merits in accordance with the best interests of the children. 8
The temporary custody order of a foreign jurisdiction is not entitled
to full faith and credit in Florida. However, it is entitled to great weight
and respect under the doctrine of comity. Normally, the Florida court,
under the comity doctrine, will respect the foreign decree unless there has
133. McManus v. McManus, 238 So.2d 473 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
134. Chandler v. Chandler, 226 So.2d 697 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
135. Bradley v. Bradley, 244 So.2d 498 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
136. Longo v. Longo, 245 So.2d 658 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
137. Anderson v. Anderson, 234 So.2d 722 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
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been, since the rendition of the decree, a change in circumstances which
would justify a change in custody.18
In Coker v. Montgomery,'39 the respondent in the habeas corpus
action was not a party to the original divorce action but had custody of
the child pursuant to a court order entered in the divorce action. The
District Court of Appeal, First District, held that habeas corpus is the
appropriate remedy to change the provisions of a foreign divorce decree
as to the custody of the minor child.
B. Support
1. DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE ACT
The Dissolution of Marriage Act made great substantive changes
in section 61.13 of the Florida Statutes (1969) with regard to the support
of children: 4'
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court
may at any time order either or both parents owing a duty of
support to a child of the marriage to pay such support as from the
circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case is equi-
table. The court initially entering an order requiring one or both
parents to make child support payments shall have continuing
jurisdiction after the entry of such initial order to modify the
amount of the child support payments, or the terms thereof,
where such is found to be necessary by the court for the best
interests of the child or children, or where such is found to be
necessary by the court because there has been a substantial
change in the circumstances of the parties. The court initially
entering a child support order shall also have continuing juris-
diction after the entry of such order to require the person or per-
sons awarded custody of the child or children to make a report to
the court on terms prescribed by the court as to the expenditure
or other disposition of said child support payments.
(2) ...
(3) In any proceeding under this act, the court at any stage
of the proceeding and after final judgment may make such orders
about what security is to be given for the care, custody, and
support of the minor children of the marriage, as from the cir-
cumstances of the parties and the nature of the case is equitable.
The attachment and garnishment section of the statutes, section 61.12,
was amended by the Dissolution of Marriage Act to provide that attach-
ment and garnishment may be used in child support matters."'
138. Powell v. Powell, 242 So.2d 138 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
139. 238 So.2d 490 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
140. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, § 15, amending FLA. STAT. § 61.13 (1969).
141. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, § 14, amending FLA. STAT. § 61.12 (1969).
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2. CRITERIA FOR THE AWARD
An ex-husband testified that he was willing to pay all medical bills
incurred for medical treatment of his children except for expenses for
cosmetic forms of dentistry and surgery incurred without his approval.
The trial judge ordered the husband to pay only major medical and dental
bills. The appellate court reversed the trial court and stated that the
husband should pay all medical bills "provided that he shall not be re-
quired to pay such expenses for cosmetic forms of dentistry and surgery
unless incurred after his prior consent thereto."' 4 2
It is error for a trial court to fail to require a husband to continue
paying the premiums on a health and accident insurance policy which he
maintained on his wife and minor daughter during the marriage because
of the facts of the case which the court failed to disclose. These undis-
closed facts also made it error for the trial court judge to fail to require
the husband to pay the expenses for summer camp for his daughter and
to pay a $1,000 air conditioning bill which the wife had incurred for air
conditioning the marital home.4 3
3. ENFORCEMENT OF ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT AWARD
Florida Statute section 61.17 (1969) was amended by the new
Dissolution of Marriage Act by the insertion of the word "child" before
the word "support" throughout the section.' A similar change was made
in section 61.18 where the word "party" was substituted for the words
"the wife" in order to be consistent with the concept that either party
may receive funds from the other for child support. 4 '
4. ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT AWARD
Under a Florida statute, the wages of the head of a household may
be garnished to enforce court orders "for alimony, suit money or support,
or other orders in actions for divorce or alimony." " 6 The District Court
of Appeal, Fourth District, has held that when the wife has secured a
common law judgment for arrearages accruing under a support agree-
ment between a husband and wife which was never made part of a
divorce decree or judgment, garnishment cannot be employed because
the judgment is based upon a contract rather than upon an order of sup-
port in an action for divorce or alimony.'4 7
In a case of first impression, the District Court of Appeal, First
142. Kirk v. Kirk, 230 So.2d 694, 696 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
143. Taxay v. Taxay, 246 So.2d 616 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
144. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, § 18, amending FLA. STAT. § 61.17 (1969).
145. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-241, § 19, amending FLA. STAT. § 61.18 (1969).
146. FLA. STAT. § 61.12 (1969).
147. Healey v. Toolan, 227 So.2d 55 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969). See Kowel v. Kowel, 240
So.2d 508 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), which affirmed the trial court's refusal to compel the
husband to produce stock certificates in order to make them available for levy in an
anticipated judgment for child support arrearages.
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District, held that a trial court loses jurisdiction to cite a father for con-
tempt for his failure to abide by a child support order at the time the
children become adults even though the order was for a period long prior
to the date of the contempt proceedings. 4 '
A former wife sought to have the trial court enforce the support
provisions of a final judgment which provided for child support for seven
children. The husband defended his failure to comply fully with the
judgment on the grounds that three of the children had assumed resi-
dence with him rather than with their mother. The appellate court held
it was not erroneous for the judge to reject consideration of the husband's
defense and limit the question to one of compliance with the original
judgment. The appellate court was careful to note, however, that its de-
cision would not preclude the former husband from raising this issue
of change of residence in appropriate modification proceedings.' 49
5. MODIFICATION OF SUPPORT AWARD
The case of Jelke v. Jelke5 ° illustrates the danger in "being a volun-
teer." Subsequent to a divorce, a father had voluntarily paid child sup-
port payments in an amount in excess of that provided for in a separation
agreement. The father had also paid taxes on the home and tuition for
private schooling for the children even though he was not required to do
so by agreement or decree. Subsequently, the former wife brought suit
for modification and asked that the former husband be forced to do
what he had been doing voluntarily. The trial court refused these re-
quested modifications. The District Court of Appeal, Third District, re-
versed and gave the former wife what she had requested by using the
following semantic hocus-pocus:'"
Argument is made that the court properly left the children
to the demonstrated generosity of their father, who, having vol-
untarily made payments, would in all probability continue to
do so as soon as this litigation is terminated. While this may in
fact be true, it is not a proper basis for the court's failure to
make a modification in keeping with the needs of the children
and the ability of their father. We are most reluctant to require
an individual to do that which he has been doing voluntarily.
Nevertheless we must do so in the present instance because
courts have the duty to increase or decrease child support pay-
ments in accordance with substantial changes in the ability of
the father and the needs of the children. Here the uncontroverted
testimony shows such changes. And it is these changes-not the
factor of voluntary payments-that require today's decision.
This case, and similar ones, will cause lawyers to advise their clients
148. Wilkes v. Revels, 245 So.2d 896 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
149. Simon v. Simon, 235 So.2d 540 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
150. 233 So.2d 408 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970),
151. Id. at 410.
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to restrain their generous impulses and, as a consequence, will probably
result in an increase in modification suits.
It is reversible error for the trial court to order that the husband's
duty of child support should terminate at a future date which would be
in advance of the majority of the children. A trial court should retain
jurisdiction to modify a child support award in accordance with the chang-
ing conditions, i.e., the father's financial ability, necessity of a college edu-
cation, etc., which may occur during the minority of the children."'
In Eaton v. Eaton,"' the parties executed a separation agreement
in which the wife relinquished any right for child support from her hus-
band. The parties were divorced, and the trial court approved the agree-
ment and made it part of the final judgment. A few months later, the wife
petitioned for child support on the ground that the agreement was void.
The trial court agreed with the wife's contention and awarded a token
payment of $10 per month. The husband appealed. While the district
court recognized that a father may not abrogate his duty of support by
contract, it nevertheless reversed the trial court's decision on the grounds
that there had not been a change in circumstances since the entry of the
divorce judgment. Of course, if the facts do change, the former wife may
then have the trial court award her child support.
6. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
Florida is not bound to give full faith and credit to Colorado judg-
ments for arrearages in child support when the defendant father was not
given notice of the Colorado proceedings wherein the arrearage judg-
ments were rendered. 4
X. ADOPTION
A. Jurisdiction
The juvenile court loses jurisdiction over a child upon the entry of
an order permanently committing him to the State Department of Public
Welfare for subsequent adoption. 5 Likewise, a Florida court has no
jurisdiction to enter a decree of adoption subsequent to the death of the
adopting father.5 6
B. Rights and Duties
In a case of first impression, the District Court of Appeal, First
District, has held that, although a judgment permanently committing a
152. Register v. Register, 230 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
153. 238 So.2d 166 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
154. Villano v. Harper, 248 So.2d 205 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
155. In re D.A.W., 240 So.2d 524 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
156. Korbin v. Ginsberg, 232 So.2d 417 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970). It is to be noted that
the children were seeking neither specific performance of an agreement to support them
during their minority nor a child's share of the adopting father's estate.
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child to a licensed child placing agency for adoption deprives the natural
parents of all rights in the child, it does not relieve the father of his
duty to contribute to the support of the child while in the hands of the
agency or in the custody of the mother after the agency has voluntarily
relinquished custody.157
Except for the right of an adopted child to inherit from his natural
parents, the effect of a legal adoption is to completely sever all legal ties
between the child and its natural parents. As a result, a child who has been
adopted has no cause of action for the wrongful death of his natural
father."5 8
C. Proof of Parentage
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, has held that it is
within the discretion of the trial court judge in adoption proceedings to
order that blood samples be taken from the child, the adopting father and
from a man who was married to the child's mother in order to determine
paternity. The case involved a child born during coverture. The adopting
father claimed that he, rather than the husband of the child's mother,
was the natural father. In effect, the adopting father was attempting to
bastardize the child.159
D. Adoption of an Adult
When it is demonstrated that a proposed adoption of an adult will
be for the permanent benefit of the adult adoptee, it would appear that the
adoption should be granted regardless of the strong opposition of the
father of the adult adoptee and regardless of the fact that the father
never abandoned his child during his minority. 60
XI. JUVENILE COURTS AND JUVENILES
A. Dependency Proceedings
At a prior hearing, the paternal grandparents had been awarded
temporary custody of the children. At the dependency hearing, the juve-
nile judge refused to permit the grandparents' counsel to be present. At a
later hearing dealing with the custody question, the juvenile judge re-
fused the grandparent's counsel the right to examine the social
worker's report concerning the condition of the children. The District
Court of Appeal, First District, held that these refusals by the juvenile
judge during the dependency proceedings constituted reversible error.'
157. Morris v. Stone, 236 So.2d 455 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
158. Gessner v. Powell, 238 So.2d 101 (Fla. 1970).
159. In re Adoption of Samples v. Manousos, 226 So.2d 135 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1969).
160. In re Adoption of Miller, 227 So.2d 73 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1969).
161. In re A.W., 230 So.2d 200 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
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B. Delinquency Proceedings
Florida Statutes section 39.06(2) (1969) requires that the sum-
mons, served on a custodian of a child in delinquency proceedings, must
briefly recite the substance of the petition asking for the adjudication of
delinquency. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, has held
that, under this statute and under due process standards, the summons
must state the alleged misconduct with reasonable particularity. Also, it
must be served sufficiently in advance of the scheduled court hearing to
provide a reasonable opportunity for preparation to meet the charges.6 2
Under Florida Statutes section 39.03(3) (1969), a person arresting
a juvenile must deliver him by the most practicable route to the juvenile
court in the county. The statute is violated if arresting officers take a
juvenile to the police station and interrogate him for two hours in order
to obtain a confession of armed robbery. Therefore, the confession must
be suppressed in delinquency proceedings subsequently brought against
the minor."'
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, applied Miranda v.
Arizona' to a juvenile delinquency hearing. The court held that if the
child were not given the proper warnings after arrest, or otherwise sig-
nificantly deprived of his liberty, then any statements given to the officer
could not be used as "direct evidence or for impeachment .... ,,"65 The
holding with reference to impeachment would seem to be displaced by the
recent United States Supreme Court case of Harris v. New York. 6
The Supreme Court of Florida has devised a clever solution to the
statutory rule 67 which fails to provide for any supersedeas in cases in-
volving delinquency proceedings: 16
It is our view that after a determination of delinquency shall
have been made, juvenile court judges may, in their discretion,
release children from custody, under reasonable conditions which
they may impose, during a valid appeal taken in good faith and
if the court finds that such release shall not be detrimental to
the child or to society.
Florida Statutes section 39.03(7) (1969) was amended by adding
language which provides that no child held in custody under a special
order, i.e., on order of the juvenile court judge ordering the detention of
162. In re V.D., 245 So.2d 273 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971), citing In re Gault, 387
U.S. 1 (1967). See In re A.J., 241 So.2d 439 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970), as to the degree of proof
necessary in an adjudication of delinquency.
163. In re A.J.A., 248 So.2d 690 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
164. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
165. In re V.D., 245 So.2d 273, 276 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
166. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
167. FLA. STAT. § 39.14(5) (1969).
168. A.J. v. Presley, 234 So.2d 660 (Fla. 1970).
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a child for more than 2 days, shall be held for more than thirty days
without being adjudicated as a dependent or delinquent child.' 69
Section 39.01(12)(b) of the Florida Statutes (1969) was also
amended. It now provides that a child who has been adjudicated for the
second time by a juvenile court for having committed an act which would
justify his being adjudicated as a "child in need of supervision," (e.g.,
the child is incorrigible, or a persistent truant from school, or is growing
up in idleness or crime, etc.) may be adjudicated to be a delinquent
child.'7 0
C. Criminal Proceedings
Under section 39.02 (6) of the Florida Statutes (1969) it is the duty
of a juvenile court judge to make specific findings that it is in the best
interests of the public that jurisdiction over the juvenile be waived and
jurisdiction transferred to the appropriate court for criminal proceed-
ings against the juvenile. These findings of fact are a prerequisite to the
entry of an order transferring the cause to a criminal court.'
Section 932.38 of the Florida Statutes (1969) requires written
notice to the father of the charges against his son. If, however, the father
has actual knowledge of the charges, written notice is not required.
Where the father of an unmarried minor attended his arraignment and
one trial session and heard in open court that the trial was to be con-
tinued to a definite future date, this constituted sufficient actual knowl-
edge of a charge lodged against his son so as to come within the exception
to the statutory requirement of written notice.'72
D. Legislation
Chapter 959 of the Florida Statutes (1969) was amended by the
addition of section 959.115.178 The new statute provides that, as an al-
ternative to sentencing a child to a state prison, or county or municipal
jail, the judge of any court having criminal jurisdiction may commit the
child to the division of youth services, provided that the director of the
division of youth services is willing to receive the child. The commitment
shall be for an indeterminate period of time, but shall not exceed either
the maximum sentence allowable by law for the offense for which the
child has been found guilty or the child's twenty-first birthday, which-
ever is sooner.
Florida has recently adopted a statewide probation and parole sys-
tem for juveniles designed to foster the treatment of juvenile offenders
169. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-353, § 1, amending FLA. STAT. § 39.03(7) (1969).
170. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-117, § 1, amending FLA. STAT. § 39.01(12) (b) (1969).
171. Gagliano v. State, 234 So.2d 159 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
172. State v. Whitter, 245 So.2d 913 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). See also Higginbotham v.
State, 248 So.2d 540 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
173. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-353, § 6. The same bill added FLA. STAT. §§ 959.23,
959.24, 959.25 and amended FLA. STAT. § 959.13 (1969).
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in the community rather than in an institution. The rationale underlying
the system is that it is more efficient and less expensive to treat the
juvenile in his home community than in an institution. 4 It is suggested
that this juvenile probation and parole system will be as ineffective as
Florida's adult probation and parole system because of a lack of ade-
quate financing.
E. Miscellaneous Legislation Affecting Minors
Surgical or medical care by doctors, hospitals or public clinics ren-
dered minors afflicted with an infectious, contagious or communicable
disease may now be administered with the consent of the minor patient
alone. The consent of a parent or guardian is no longer necessary. 1 5
Any minor who is at least 18 years old may now be a blood donor
without compensation and may give his consent to "the penetration of
tissue which is necessary to accomplish such donation."'16 The consent
of the minor's parents is not required and the minor may not disaffirm
his consent.
Public school students who marry, or who are pregnant and un-
married, or who have already had a child outside of wedlock are now en-
titled to attend school. They are likewise "entitled to the same educational
instruction or its equivalent as other students, but may be assigned to a
special class or program better suited to their special needs.'"
The penalty for willful torture, caging or mutilating of a child under
age sixteen has been increased from two years imprisonment or a fine
not exceeding $2,000, or both, to 20 years imprisonment or a fine not
exceeding $10,000, or both.'
Sections 743.01 to 743.05 of the Florida Statutes (1969), dealing
with the removal of disabilities of nonage of minors, were substantially re-
worded to delete obsolete and unnecessary language.'1 9
XII. GUARDIANSHrP
A. In General
When the record of an incompetency proceeding contains no evi-
dence indicating that the notice of hearing was properly served on the al-
leged incompetent or that he was given reasonable notice of the hearing
prior to the day it was held, the question of the court's jurisdiction to
enter a judgment of incompetency may properly be brought into question
by a petition filed by the alleged incompetent. These questions may be
174. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-130, §§ 1-12, adding FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01, 39.03, 39.04, 39.05,
39.06, 39.11, 39.12, 959.011, 959.28.
175. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-58, § 1, adding FLA. STAT. § 384.061.
176. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-430, § 1, amending FLA. STAT. § 743.06 (1969).
177. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-21, § 1, amending FLA. STAT. § 232.01(1)(c) (1969).
178. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-8, § 1, amending FLA. STAT. § 824.04 (1969).
179. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-147, §§ 1-3, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 743.01-.05 (1969).
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resolved only by a full evidentiary hearing, and it is error for the county
judge to deny the petition on the basis of the court record and to refuse to
grant the hearing.180
If, at the time of the commitment of an incompetent, there is no
statute allowing the state to recover reasonable costs for his care and
maintenance from his estate, the state may not recover for such costs.
This is true even though a statute is subsequently enacted while the in-
competent is still being cared for by the state. 8 '
B. Guardianship Legislation
Florida has adopted a detailed "Mental Health Act"'82 which pro-
vides for long overdue civil rights safeguards for mentally ill incompe-
tents. The provisions of the act include the appointment of lawyers as
"hearing examiners," rights of habeas corpus, and the right of incom-
petents to be represented by legal counsel, including appointed counsel for
indigents. This civil rights approach is also found in the new "Compre-
hensive Alcoholism Prevention Control and Treatment Act"' 88 which is
designed to treat alcoholism as a disease rather than a crime. However,
it is submitted that the new act's definition of the term "alcoholic" as
meaning "any person who chronically and habitually uses alcoholic
beverages (a) to the extent that it injures his health or substantially inter-
feres with his social or economic functioning . . ." is subject to consti-
tutional attack for overbreadth. Fortunately, this broadness is tempered
by a later provision' which appears to condition involuntary adjudication
to cases where the
alcoholic . . . has lost the power of self-control with respect to
the use of alcoholic beverages and (a) that he has threatened, at-
tempted or actually inflicted physical harm on himself or others;
or (b) that he is in need of medical treatment and care, and that
by reason of chronic alcoholism his judgment has been so im-
paired that he is incapable of appreciating his need for care and
of making a rational decision in regard thereto ....
Apparently, this act is in need of some re-drafting.
Florida has enacted the "Interstate Compact of Mental Health"
which is designed to provide for the transfer of mentally ill and mentally
deficient patients between various states adopting the compact. Provision
180. In re White, 230 So.2d 480 (Fla. Ist Dist. 1970).
181. Kirk v. Wiggin, 242 So.2d 725 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
182. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-131, transferring and amending FLA. STAT. § 402.10 (1969),
amending FLA. STAT. § 744.31 (1969), repealing FLA. STAT. §§ 394.01, 394.011, 394.012,
394.013, 394.02, 394.03, 394.031, 394.04, 394.05, 394.06, 394.07, 394.08, 394.09, 394.10,
394.11, 394.12, 394.13, 394.14, 394.15, 394.16, 394.17, 394.18, 394.191, 394.192,
394.20, 394.201, 394.22, 394.23, 394.24, 394.25, 394.251, 394.26, 394.27, 394.271, 394.272,
394.39, 394.40, 394.41, 394.42, 394.43, 394.45 (1969).
183. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-132, repealing FLA. STAT. § 856.01 (1969), amending FLA.
STAT. ch. 856 (1969).
184. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-132, § 10(1).
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is also made for the care of patients while they are within the various
states.S 5
Section 65.061(2) of the Florida Statutes (1969) deals with quieting
title to real estate. It was amended by the addition of the following lan-
guage in the middle of the present subsection: "a guardian ad litem shall
not be appointed unless it shall affirmatively appear that the interest of
minors, persons of unsound mind, or convicts are involved."' 80
A guardian of the property may now execute a deed, lease or mort-
gage in the name of the ward conveying, leasing, mortgaging or releasing
any actual or apparent interest of the ward in any property including
homestead property.18 7
Section 710.08 of the Florida Statutes (1969), the Gifts to Minors
Act, was substantially reworded with respect to the resignation, death or
removal of custodians, the appointment of successor custodians, perfor-
mance bonds, etc. It is interesting to note that a minor who is fourteen
and who does not have a guardian has the power under this amended
section to designate a successor custodian. 188
C. Conservatorship Legislation
The Florida law governing "conservatorships" was substantially
changed by the following: rewording of the provision relating to the
jurisdiction of the circuit court to authorize the appointment of a con-
servator of the estate of an "absentee"; by adding a summary procedure
system; authorizing procedure for use by the wife or next of kin of an
absentee; providing for the posting of a bond by the conservator; deline-
ating the rights, powers and duties of a conservator; adopting the
guardianship provisions governing the resignation of a conservator; and
providing for the termination of conservatorship proceedings.8 9
XIII. ILLEGITIMACY
A Florida court needs personal jurisdiction to adjudicate whether an
individual is the father of an illegitimate child. Likewise, the court does
not have jurisdiction to award an in personam judgment against a non-
resident for support of the child. 90
Section 731.29 of the Florida Statutes (1969) provides that an il-
legitimate child may not inherit any part of the estate of his parents' kin-
185. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-219, repealing FLA. STAT. §§ 394.27, 394.271 (1969), amending
FLA. STAT. ch. 394 (1969) (in general).
186. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-278, § 1, amending FLA. STAT. § 65.061(2) (1969).
187. Fla. Laws 1970, ch. 70-45, amending FLA. STAT. § 745.15(1) (1969).
188. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-23, § 1, adding FLA. STAT. § 710.08.
189. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-103, §§ 1-13, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 747.01, 747.02, 747.03,
747.04 (1969), adding §§ 747.021, 747.022, 747.031, 747.032, 747.033, 747.034, 747.035,
747.036.
190. T.J.K. v. N.B., 237 So.2d 592 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970), followed in J.E.S. v. B.J.F.
240 So.2d 520 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
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dred unless they subsequently marry. The section further provides that
the illegitimate inherits from his mother and his father if the father
acknowledges his paternity in writing in the presence of a competent
witness. The constitutionality of section 731.29 was upheld by the Su-
preme Court of Florida in the case of In Re Estate of Caldwell.19' The
court refused to find that this statute was a denial of equal protection
despite the fact that the Supreme Court of the United States had previously
held that it is a denial of equal protection for a state to deny an illegiti-
mate child the right of recovery for the wrongful death of his mother 9'
and to deny a mother of an illegitimate child a cause of action for his
wrongful death.19 The Florida court held that these federal cases were
distinguished upon the ground that they involved wrongful death actions
rather than rights of inheritance. Subsequent to the filing of the opinion
in Caldwell, the Supreme Court of the United States apparently ruled in
accordance with the Supreme Court of Florida that inheritance is a mat-
ter to be decided by the states.1'9
In a case of apparent first impression in Florida, the District Court
of Appeal, Fourth District, has held that a father of an illegitimate son
has no standing to sue for the son's wrongful death. The right of action
seems to be confined to the mother. 9"
A California decree provided that the father had to support his il-
legitimate child until the child's twenty-first birthday. Subsequently, the
mother brought suit on the judgment in Florida to make it a domestic
judgment. In another case of apparent first impression, the District Court
of Appeal, Second District, held that Florida has the power to modify the
California decree to provide that the obligation of support will terminate
when the child becomes eighteen.'96
It should be noted that it is legally possible for a father, now deceased,
to have acknowledged paternity of a child four days after its conception
even though the father died before the birth of the child.
19 7
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has held that the
mother of a child born in wedlock, or conceived while she was married
(even though it was born 283 days after the divorce of the mother),
cannot maintain an action to have a man other than her spouse declared
to be the father of the child. The presumption of legitimacy is rebuttable,
but it may not be challenged by the mother. 99
191. 247 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1971).
192. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
193. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
194. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
195. City of West Palm Beach v. Cowart, 241 So.2d 748 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
196. D.R.T. v. O.M., 244 So.2d 752 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
197. Ezell-Titterton, Inc. v. A.K.F., 234 So.2d 360 (Fla. 1970).
198. Smith v. Wise, 234 So.2d 145 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
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XV. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Intrafamily Litigation
In a case of first impression in Florida (and perhaps of second im-
pression in the United States), the District Court of Appeal, Third Dis-
trict, held that a father may sue his son on an oral contract entered into
when the son was eighteen wherein the father agreed to advance monies
for the education of the son as a dentist in return for the son's promise to
pay back the sums advanced subsequent to his starting his dental practice.
The facts showed that the son, after reaching his majority, wrote a letter
to his father confirming the oral contract and agreeing to make monthly
payments, and that substantial payments were made until the son ex-
pressed the view that he was never obligated to repay the sums advanced.
The court held that the evidence showed that the son ratified the contract
after reaching his majority and that this ratification is binding without
consideration.199
Even though a son has not been emancipated by statutory proceed-
ings, there may be evidence sufficient to show that he has been, in fact,
emancipated and is, therefore, competent to sue his father for injuries
suffered in an automobile accident.10 A wife, however, has no cause of
action against her husband for slander which occurred during coverture
but after the parties separated and while divorce proceedings were in
progress.2 01
B. Loss of Consortium and Tort Actions
The Supreme Court of Florida has finally held that a wife has a
cause of action for loss of consortium (husband's companionship, affection
and sexual relations) against a person who negligently injures her hus-
band 2 The cause of action is derivative in nature. That is, the wife may
recover only if her husband has a cause of action against the same de-
fendant. Although it is not entirely clear, the decision apparently was
based upon the notion that the common law rule was now outdated be-
cause of the change in the legal status of women as reflected by the Florida
Constitution and statutes, federal civil rights statutes, case decisions from
other jurisdictions, and legal literature in general.
C. Torts
In a case of first impression in Florida, the District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, has held that a minor child who had been adopted by
others during the lifetime of his natural father does not have a cause of
199. Robertson v. Robertson, 229 So.2d 642 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
200. Owen v. Owen, 234 So.2d 165 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970).
201. Papy v. Frischkorn, 234 So.2d 718 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1970).
202. Gates v. Foley, 247 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1971), rev'g 233 So.2d 190 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1970). Banores v. Austin, 248 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1971), rev'g 240 So.2d 850 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970).
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action for the wrongful death of his natural father. The rationale for the
court's decision was twofold. First, section 63.151 of the Florida Statutes
provides that the natural parents are relieved of all legal duties towards
their child subsequent to adoption. Second, the intent of the wrongful
death statute is to give a cause of action to those who have suffered a
compensable loss as the result of the wrongful death. Therefore, it would
be wrong to deprive others who may have suffered this loss in favor of
the adopted child who would suffer no legal loss.2°8
A divorced mother may recover for the wrongful death of her minor
child which occurred during the marriage." 4
D. Child Abuse Legislation
The Child Abuse statutes were extensively amended to provide that
a physician, nurse, teacher, social worker or employee of a public or pri-
vate facility serving children who has reason to believe that a child has
been abused shall report this fact to the Department of Health and Re-
habilitative Services. The amendment made some interesting changes deal-
ing with immunity and privileged evidence:20 '
(9) Immunity.-Anyone participating in the making of a
report pursuant to this act or participating in a judicial proceed-
ing resulting therefrom prima facie shall be presumed to be act-
ing in good faith and in so doing shall be immune from any
liability, civil or criminal, that otherwise might be incurred or
imposed.
(10) Evidenced privileged.-The physician-patient privi-
lege, husband-wife privilege, or any privilege except the attorney-
client privilege and the privilege provided in Chapter 90.241 of
the Florida Statutes, provided for or covered by law, both as they
relate to the competency of the witness and to the exclusion of
confidential communications, shall not pertain in any civil or
criminal litigation in which a child's neglect, dependency, abuse
or abandonment is in issue nor in any judicial proceedings result-
ing from a report submitted pursuant to this act.
203. Powell v. Gessner, 231 So.2d 50 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
204. McDonald v. Forman, 238 So.2d 131 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970).
205. Fla. Laws 1971, ch. 71-97, § 1, amending FLA. STAT. § 828.041 (1969).
